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PUBLIC NUISANCE
AND STANDING TO SUE
By WILFRED ESTEY*
I Introduction: Definitional Problems in Nuisance
Few words in the legal vocabulary are bedevilled with as much obscurity and
confusion as nuisance. Once tolerably precise and well-understood, the concept
has eventually become so amorphous as well-nigh to defy rational exposition.
Much of the difficulty and complication surrounding the subject stems from the
fact that the term nuisance is today applied as a label for an exceedingly wide
range of legal situations, many of which have little in common with one another.
Far from susceptible of exact definition, it has become a catch all for a multitude
of ill-assorted sins... and a list of... rag ends of the law.1
Much of the reason for this obfuscation is apparently historical. In the
sixteenth century, the courts first allowed a private suit to redress damages
suffered as a result of a public nuisance on the ground that the plaintiff had
suffered damages over and above those suffered by the rest of the community.2
This was done despite the heedings of earlier courts that the defendant in such
a situation might be punished several times over for a single wrongdoing. Up
until this time public nuisances were always crimes,3 relatively minor in nature
whose common thread was interference with the exercise of some public
right.4 The intrusion of public nuisance into the field of tort law resulted in the
application of one legal term, nuisance, to two conceptually different causes
of action. Private nuisance, broadly speaking, refers to an invasion of some
interest of an owner in the use and enjoyment of his land, whereas public
nuisance refers to a catch-all of miscellaneous offences, not necessarily related
to the enjoyment of land, involving some discomfort or inconvenience to
the general public in the exercise of what is usually referred to as a public right.
One writer has described the concept of public nuisance in this way:
Public nuisance has a schizophrenic character. Basically it refers to a rather
motley group of criminal or quasi-criminal offences which involve actual or
potential interference with the public conveniences of welfare... Since a public
nuisance may be committed and its effects may be felt almost anywhere, it has no
obvious connection with interference with interests in land.5
*Member of the 1971 Graduating Class of Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University.
1J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed. Australia: The Law Book Co. of
Australia Ltd., 1971) at 338.
2J. Fitzherbest in Anon (1935) Y.B. 27 H. VIII, f. 27, Mich. pl. 10.
31n fact one textbook author has stated: "no case has been found of tort liability
for a public nuisance which was not a crime." William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law
of Torts (4th ed. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1971) n. 60 at 586.
4 For a succinct historical review of the tort of nuisance see Fleming, supra, note 1
at 339-340.
5J. P. S. McLaren, "Nuisance in Canada", in Studies in Canadian Tort Law,
ed. Allen M. Linden, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) at 325.
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The courts have grappled with a working definition of public nuisance as well
and probably the best that can be said is that a public nuisance "is a nuisance
which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it is
not reasonable to expect one person on his own responsibility to put a stop to
it, but that it should be taken in the responsibility of the community at large."'6
Thus a public nuisance is an act not sanctioned by law which causes incon-
venience or damage to or interferes with the reasonable comfort of a class of
Her Majesty's subjects in the exercise of a right common to all.7 The analysis
which a court undertakes to determine whether a public nuisance exists is
usually twofold: (1) is there a public right common to all that is being interfered
with in some way and (2) is the interference affecting a sufficient number of
persons to constitute it a public nuisance. The term "public rights" here
must necessarily be given a broad interpretation: it encompasses a broad spec-
trum of rights or interests ranging from the right to fish in the public waters,8
the right to navigate public waters free from obstruction 9 and the right to
travel a public highway unimpeded, 10 to a host of less well-defined interests
such as the right of freedom from interference with public health," public
morals,12 public comfort 3 or the breach of a public right created by statute.14
In other words, a public nuisance must interfere with some interest common
to all. Once this has been proved it is not necessary to show that every possessor
of that interest is affected. Otherwise proof of a public nuisance would be an
exercise in futility.15 It need only be shown that it would affect anyone who
attempted to exercise that public right or that the nuisance interferes with
6A..G. v. P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd., [1957] 1 All E.R. 894 (CA.) per Denning L. J.
at908.
7See Hickey v. Electric Reduction Company of Canada (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d)
368 (Nfld. S.C.); A.-G. for Ont. v. Orange Productions (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 257
(Ont. H.C.).
8A..G. for B.C. v. A.-G. for Can. (1913), 15 D.L.R. 308 (J.C.P.C.) at 315 per
Lord Haldane; A.-G. for Can. v. A.-G. for Que. (1921), 56 D.L.R. 358 (J.C.P.C.) at
361 per Lord Haldane; and see McRae v. British Norwegian Whaling Co. Ltd., [1927-31]
Nfld. L.R. 274 (Nfld. S.C.) per Kent J.: "it is an established principle that the right to
fish in the sea and public navigable waters is free and open to all. It is a public right that
may be exercised by any of the King's subjects and for any interference with it the usual
remedies to vindicate a public right must be employed."
9 Wood v. Esson (1884),9 S.C.R. 239 per Strong J. at 243.
l0 lveson v. Moore 91 E.R. 1224.
1A..G. for Ontario v. Orange Productions, supra, note 7, where on the basis of past
experience nudity, sexual intercourse in public, drunkenness, obscene language, noise,
dust, smoke, traffic jams, loss of water supply, danger to safety and danger to public health
were all anticipated at an upcoming rock concert. Thus the producers of the concert were
enjoined from staging it.
12d.
13A.-G. v. P.Y.A. Quarries, supra, note 6, where the discomfoit resulted from dust
and vibration from the working of a rock quarry. See Prosser, supra, note 3 at 583-85
where the author has collected cases on each of the aforementioned areas.
14A..G. v. Bastow, [1957] 1 All E.R. 497 (Q.B.) per Devlin J. at 500.
15"It is obvious . . .that it is not a prerequisite of a public nuisance that all of
Her Majesty's subjects should be affected by it; for otherwise no public nuisance could
ever be established at all," per Romer L.A in A.-G. v. P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd., supra,
note 6 at 900.
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rights enjoyed by a sufficiently large number of persons to constitute a class of
the public. These questions are always questions of fact. Moreover, once the
scope of the class is defined it is not then necessary to show that every member
of the class is affected, only a representative sample. Further to the problem
of proof, it is apparently sufficient to show an accumulation of private nuisances:
in general however a public nuisance is proved by the cumulative effect which it
is shown to have had on the people living within its sphere of influence. In other
words, a normal and legitimate way of proving a public nuisance is to prove a
sufficiently large collection of private nuisances.16
Pollution is nearly always a public nuisance. 17 This is so because some
public right, such as the right to fish, is usually being interfered with or the
right to breathe relatively clean air is being abrogated by noxious odours and
some class of the public is inconvenienced. Thus, it is fairly easy to show that
pollution of a stream is a public nuisance once it is shown that more than a
few riparian owners are affected. And it has been suggested in several cases
that everyone is entitled to a sufficient supply of untainted air, in an amount
necessary for his reasonable use.18 Again, any interference with this right
would be termed a public nuisance.
Public nuisance can also be a criminal offence. Section 165 of the Criminal
Code of Canada states that:
(1) Everyone who commits a common nuisance and thereby
(a) endangers the lives, safety, health, property or comfort of the public, or
(b) causes physical injury to any person,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two
years.
(2) For the purposes of this section, every one commits a common nuisance who
does an unlawful act or fails to discharge a legal duty and thereby
(a) endangers the lives, safety, health, property or comfort of the public, or
(b) obstructs the public in the exercise of any right common to all subjects
of Her Majesty in Canada.
It should be .pointed out that resort to this remedy has been rare in Canada
despite the breadth of its language and its apparently untrammelled scope. 19
161d., at 906.
17See Hickey v. Electric Reduction Company of Canada, supra, note 7; McRae v.
British Norwegian Whaling Ltd., supra, note 8; Fillion v. N.B. International Paper Co.,
[1934] 3 D.L.R. 22 (N.B.C.A.); Stephens v. Richmond Hill, [1956] O.R. 88 (Ont. C.A.);
Godfrey v. Good Rich Refining Co. Ltd., [1940] O.R. 190 (Ont. C.A.); Groat v. Edmonton,
[1928] S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).
lsCartwright v. Gray (1966), 12 Gr. Ch. 399 per Mowat V.C. at 401-02; Canada
Paper Co. v. Brown (1922), 63 S.C.R. 243 at 254; Cairns v. Canada Refining & Smelting Co.
(1913), 5 O.W.N. 423 (Ch. Div.); Godfrey v. Good Rich Refining, supra, note 17; Bottom
v. Ontario Leaf Tobacco Co. Ltd., [1935] O.R. 205 (C.A.).
19 See for example, The King v. The Toronto Railway Co. (1905), 10 O.L.R. 26 (C.A.)
where the defendant company was charged and convicted of criminal common nuisance
on the ground that they were negligently operating some of their street cars thereby
endangering the lives and safety of the public. To the same effect see Union Colliery Co. v.
The Queen (1900), 31 S.C.R. 81 where the company maintained a bridge in a negligent
fashion, resulting in a serious accident and death to several passengers. And see Re Rex v.
County of Lambton (1926), 30 O.W.N. 290 (H.C.) where the defendant corporation was
indicted on the ground that it had shown "a shocking neglect of the highway" rendering
it dangerous for all those who attempted to pass on it.
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II Public Nuisance and Standing to Sue
Generally speaking, whenever public rights are infringed the Attorney-
General as public representative and official guardian of these rights is the only
one capable of bringing suit to remedy these wrongs. In the criminal field, it is
only in specific and rather limited circumstances that a private individual can
prosecute another for an allegedly criminal act. And even then, a private
prosecutor can only proceed with the knowledge and under the control of the
Crown. Similarly in the civil field, it is usually the Attorney-General who has
the sole responsibility for redressing a public nuisance or the breach of a
statutory duty running to the community at large; that is, one not enacted for
the benefit of any one particular individual. The analogy between a crime and
a nuisance is not wholly apt however: the whole of Her Majesty's subjects are
said to be affected by a crime and the Attorney-General therefore sues as their
representative whereas, as we have already seen, not everyone is affected by a
public nuisance, only those who come within its ambit.20 Thus,
it is not merely because the public is affected that the Attorney-General sues in
cases of public nuisance but because the thing complained of injures all those
who come within the range of the offending act, and it is because that act injures
all those who come within its range that the public in general are said to be
injured. The act itself must be of such a nature as to cause injury, not because it
is declared to be illegal, but because of its character. The act itself may be
perfectly legal and it may be an unfortunate combination of circumstances which
constitutes it a nuisance. And in all cases of public nuisance an individual who
is specially damnified can recover damages quite apart from the right of the
Attorney-General to restrain the nuisance on behalf of the public.2 '
Thus, the general principle is that a private person cannot seek relief when he
is injured by a public nuisance. Only the Attorney-General, representing the
class of the public affected, is the proper person to sue. 2 This rule avoids a
potential multiplicity of actions that could result if all the members of the
affected public were permitted to sue.23 In the result, the private individual's
usual remedy is to act as a relator to the Attorney-General, that is to inform
2OSee supra, note 15 and accompanying text.
21A..G. for Ontario v. Canadian Wholesale Grocers Assoc. (1922), 52 O.L.R. 536
(H.C.) at 547. In this case the Attorney-General was suing on behalf of the public for a
declaration and an injunction to restrain defendants from carrying on what was allegedly
an unlawful trade combination contrary to s. 498 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The
court denied the relief sought on the ground that this would increase the penalties the law
had prescribed for such conduct. Thus unless property rights were affected, no public
or private right of action existed. An injunction will not therefore issue to restrain an
illegal act affecting the public in general merely because it was illegal. This decision was
upheld on appeal: (1923), 24 O.W.N. 187.
22Cairns v. Canadian Refining & Smelting Co. (1913), 5 O.W.N. 423 (H.C.) at 424
which was reversed at 6 O.W.N. 562 (C.A.) on the facts only; St. Lawrence Rendering Co.
v. Cornwall, [1951] O.R. 669 per Spence J. at 673.
23 Walsh v. Ervin, [1952] V.L.R. 361 (S.C. Vict.) at 368 per Shall J.: "... it is to
avoid the multiplicity of actions which might result if many members of the public sued,
without proof of actual damage, in respect of such infringement of their right, that the
law requires in such a case the Attorney-General must sue on behalf of all."; and see
Fillion v. New Brunswick International Paper Company, supra, note 17 at 26 per Baxter J.:
"... it is inexpedient that there should be a multiplicity of actions and ...where a
nuisance or injury is common to the whole public the remedy is by indictment but ...
no private right of action exists unless there is a special or particular injury to the plaintiff."
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the Attorney-General of what is alleged to be a public nuisance. The Attorney-
General's ability to act however is not contingent upon the existence of a relator:
he has the power to act on his own initiative and fill an ex officio information.
Indeed, this is a common practice. 24 However, the Attorney-General may well
decline to act at the relation of a private individual. It is only in rare
circumstances that a private individual may maintain the action adding the
Attorney-General as a party defendant.25 The usual rule is that the Attorney-
General's discretion here is unimpeachable and not subject to judicial review:
The discretion of the Attorney-General to decide in what cases it is proper for
him to institute proceedings with respect to public nuisances is absolute. Among
the many authorities which could be cited in support of this principle I content
myself with reproducing a passage from the speech of the Earl of Halsbury in
London County Council v. A.-G., [1902] A.C. 65 at 168: 'My lords, one question
has been raised, though I think not raised here-it appears to have emerged in
the Court below-which I confess I do not understand. I mean the suggestion
that the Courts have any power over the jurisdiction of the Attorney-General
when he is suing on behalf of a relator in a matter in which he is the only person
who has to decide those questions. It may well be that it is true that the Attorney-
General ought not to put into operation the whole machinery of the first law officer
of the Crown in order to bring into Court some trifling matter. But if he did it
would not go to his jurisdiction; it would go I think to the conduct of his office
and it might be made, perhaps in Parliament, the subject of adverse comment;
but what right has a Court of law to intervene? If there is excess of power claimed
by a particular public body and it is a matter that concerns the public it seems
to me that it is for the Attorney-General and not for the Courts to determine
whether he ought to initiate litigation in that respect or not ... mhe initiation
of the litigation, and the determination of the question whether it is a proper case
for the Attorney-General to participate in, is a matter entirely beyond the juris-
diction of this or any other court. It is a question which the law of this country
has made to reside exclusively in the Attorney-General. I make this observation
upon it, though the thing has not been urged here at all, because it seems to me
to be very undesirable to throw any doubt upon the jurisdiction or the independent
exercise of it by the first law officer of the Crown.' 26
Similarly, the courts are loathe to interfere should the Attorney-General
decide to take action where the efficaciousness of that decision has been
doubted.2 7 This rule does not apply solely to the discretion residing in the
Attorney-General to decide whether to sue or not at the relation of a private
citizen but derives from the well-established principle of law that questions ot
ministerial administration are conferred on the ministers of the Crown and no
court can interfere with either the exercise of that discretion (so long as no
24See McLeod v. White (1955), 37 M.P.R. 341 (S.C.N.B-Ch. Div.) at 355; Halsbury's
Law of England (3rd ed.), vol. 30, "Practice and Procedure", para. 570 at 312.
25Turtle v. City of Toronto (1924-25), 56 O.L.R. 252 (C.A.) at 276; see discussion,
infra, notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
26 Grant v. St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, [1960] O.R. 298 per Aylesworth J.A. at
303; see also McLeod v. White, supra, note 22 at 355.
27A.-G. v. Bastow, supra, note 14 at 500-501: "it is plain that this court is not con-
cerned with the reasons which have seemed good to the Attorney-General in causing him
to bring this action.... [T]he Attorney-General is the person who is primarily responsible
for the enforcement of the law, he is the first law officer of the Crown and I think that,
if he considers it necessary to come into the court by way of a relator action to ask for
the assistance of the court in enforcing obedience to a clear provision of the law, the
court, although retaining its discretion ought to be very slow to say that the Attorney-
General ought to have exhausted other remedies before he came to the court."
1972]
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legislative provisions are breached) or the mode in which the discretion should
be exercised. 28
Regardless of whether or not the Attorney-General decides to sue, a
private individual may still desire redress for any damage he has suffered.
Unfortunately, his standing to sue in such a situation is restricted to fairly
narrow circumstances: "as the general principle is usually stated, an individual
cannot sue alone for relief in respect of a nuisance to a public highway unless
he has sustained some particular damage, in the sense of some substantial
injury, direct and not merely consequential, beyond that suffered by the public
generally." 29 An alternative formulation of the general rule has been suggested
by the New Brunswick Supreme Court: in an action involving a public nuisance,
the action shall be brought by the Attorney-General unless a private individual
can prove that (1) the interference with the public right is concomitantly an
interference with a private right of his or (2) a statute has given him a special
protection or benefit which has been invaded or (3) he can show that he has
suffered some particular direct damage over and above that incurred by the
rest of the community.3 0 To constitute particular or special damage to the
plaintiff, the injury must differ in nature, not merely in degree from that suffered
by the rest of the community.31 The rationale offered by the courts for this
rather harsh requirement is that if this were not the case, their task of defining
the requisite degree of damage to allow for relief in any given case would give
rise to insuperable difficulties. It is submitted however that in the past our courts
have been particularly adept at analyzing the facts of any given case and fashion-
ing a remedy where the plaintiff has shown that he has suffered some injury
deserving of redress at law. In this situation then it seems preferable for the
courts to open their doors to a plaintiff who claims to have been injured by a
public nuisance and grant him the opportunity at least of showing that he has
suffered sufficient damage, albeit only different in degree from the rest of the
community, to warrant compensation from the defendant. This is not the law
however. Until some public right is interfered with (for example, the obstruction
of a public highway), the mere fact that the plaintiff suffers some inconvenience
28Theodore v. Duncan, [1919] A.C. 696 (.C.P.C.) at 706; Orpen v. Attorney-
General (1924), 56 O.L.R. 327 (H.C.), 530 (C.A.) at 337; Attorney-General for Ontario v.
Toronto (1904), 8 O.L.R. 440 (Exch. Div.) at 444.
29 Walsh v. Ervin, supra, note 23 at 368.
3OMcLeod v. White, supra, note 24 at 358, citing Halsbury's Laws of England (2nd ed.),
vol. 26 at 13-15. For proposition (1) see Marriott v. East Grinstead Gas & Water Co.
[1909] 1 Ch. 70 per Swinfen Eady J. at 78; A.-G. v. Logan [1891] 2 Q.B. 100 per Wills J.
at 104 and per Vaughan Williams J. at 105; Lyon v. Fishmongers Company (1876), 1 A.C.
662 (H.L.) per Lord Cairns at 671-72; and for proposition (2) see Mayor of Devenport v.
Plymouth, Devenport Tramways Co. (1884), 52 L.T. 161 per Chitty J. at 163 and per
Bowen L.J. at 164; and for proposition (3) see Fillion v. N.B. International Paper Co.,
[1934] 3 D.L.R. 22 (N.B.C.A.) at 26; McRae v. British Norwegian Whaling Co. Ltd.
[1927-31] Nfld. L.R. 274 (Nfld. S.C.) at 282-83; Grant v. St. Lawrence Seaway Authority,[1960] O.R. 298 at 303; Canada Paper Co. v. Brown (1922), 63 S.C.R. 243 per Anglin J.
at 256. This requirement of special damage has persisted from the very first case that
allowed a private individual to recover damages for a public nuisance: see note 2, supra.
3 Turtle v. City of Toronto, (1924-25), 56 O.L.R. 252 (C.A.) at 277; St. Lawrence
Rendering Co. v. The City of Cornwall, [1951] O.R. 669 at 673.
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in that he is unable to pass upon the highway is not sufficient to grant him a
separate cause of action.32
To make matters worse, Canadian courts have exhibited a marked reluc-
tance to extend the reach of "special damage". Thus, it is apparently not suffi-
cient for a claimant to show that his business has been interfered with by some
sort of public nuisance for this is not a direct but a "consequential" damage
resulting from the nuisance.33 This appears to be a peculiarly Canadian approach
for the American courts have been more liberal in allowing recovery for this
type of injury: "[Pecuniary loss as a difference in kind] has been considered
sufficient where the plaintiff has an established business making a commercial
use of the public right with which the defendant interferes.... There are several
cases in which commercial fisheries making a localized use of public waters
have been allowed to recover for pollution where the ordinary citizen deprived
of his occasional piscatorial Sunday pleasure could not do so."'34 However,
where the plaintiff has suffered personal harm to his property the courts have
had no difficulty in finding damage different in kind.35 But, as far as defining
with any degree of precision the scope of the "special damage" requirement, it
is impossible to be dogmatic.
III Recent Canadian Case Law on Public Nuisance:
It will be useful for the purpose of analyzing the legal issues already
discussed to focus on three public nuisance cases from Eastern Canada, the
most recent being a judgment of the Chief Justice of the Newfoundland Supreme
Court. This Maritime trilogy is typical of the approach of Canadian courts in
this area. The judgment is, for the most part, characterized by pedantic and
unimaginative reasoning. While social conditions and public attitudes have
changed, the law has remained static.
The seminal case is McRae v. British Norwegian Whaling Co. Ltd.36 The
plaintiff, a commercial fisherman, brought his action against the defendant who
had built a whaling factory only 1000 yards away from the plaintiff's premises.
McRae alleged that the company polluted the waters in the area and thus
interfered with his fishing business. He also alleged that the air was contain-
32 Walsh v. Ervin, [1952] V.L.R. 361 (S.C. Vict.) at 368: "for the legal right of passing
and repassing is the same in all members of the public and it is to avoid multiplicity of
actions which might result if many members of the public sued, without proof of actual
damage, in respect of such infringement of their right that the law requires that in such a
case the Attorney-General must sue on behalf of all."
33See McRae v. British Norwegian Whaling Co. Ltd. [1927-31],Nfld. L.R. 274 at
283; Hickey v. Electric Reduction Company of Canada (1971), 21 D.L.R. (30) 368 at 370.
34 Prosser, supra, note 3 at 590-91. See for example, Hampton v. North Carolina
Pulp Co. 27 S.E. 2d 538 (1943) (S.C.N.C.) at 545 per Seawell J.: Carson v. Hercules
Powder Co. 402 S.W. 3d 640 (1966) (S.C. Ark.) per Bland J. at 642: "The Arkansas
Pollution Control Commission ... found that the appellee did pollute the waters creating
a public nuisance and rendering the waters harmful and detrimental to fish and other
aquatic life.... By polluting the water... appellee prevented the operation of [plaintif's]
business for the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 and by doing so became directly liable to
appellee for any damage to his business and loss of profits."
35Prosser, supra, note 3 at 588-89; MacLaren, supra, note 5 at 331-32.
36 [1927-31] Nfid. L.R. 274 (Nfld. S.C.).
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inated by offensive smells and that his drinking water was rendered unsafe. The
court held that because the right to fish in the sea and in navigable waters is a
right common to all Her Majesty's subjects, interference with it can only be
restrained by the Attorney-General unless a private individual can show direct
particular, and substantial damage. As we have already noted,37 the court con-
cluded that the interference with the plaintiff did not meet these requirements
because the plaintiff suffered with everyone else in the community (albeit to a
greater degree). Thus the action for the public nuisance was dismissed although
it was held that the plaintiff could succeed in his private nuisance action to
redress the damages to his drinking water. The distinction the court made was
this: the plaintiff's right to fish is a public right, for which damage could not be
recovered by the plaintiff in a private action because he could not prove
"particular direct and substantial [damage], over and above the injury thereby
inflicted upon the public in general"; but, the plaintiff's right to drinking water
was a private proprietary right, one not shared by the general community, and
based on an individual right to drink the water accruing to the plaintiff as a
user over a number of years. Thus an injunction issued to restrain the con-
tamination of the drinking water which amounted to a private nuisance and
the noxious odours and smells which also invaded a private proprietary right
of the plaintiffs in that the discomfort resulting therefrom "caused a nuisance
to the plaintiffs in the enjoyment of their property." The action based on the
public nuisance was dismissed.
Shortly thereafter, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal reviewed the law
in this area in an almost identical factual situation. In Fillion v. New Brunswick
International Paper Company38 the plaintiff complained that the defendant's
mill polluted the waters of the Restigouche River where he conducted his com-
mercial fishing operation causing him $2800 in damages resulting from inter-
ference with his business. The court held that the licences granted to the plaintiff
did not give him an exclusive right to fish in any particular part of the river and
thus did not constitute a "several fishery. '39 The plaintiff was thus left with his
rights as a member of the public. Once the court was able to come to this con-
clusion it had no difficulty disposing of the claim. Because the plaintiff had no
proprietary right in the dead fish, the court concluded that the damage he
suffered differed from that suffered by the community merely in degree, not
in kind. There was in other words no difference in the quality of the plaintiff's
damage and hence there was no foundation for a private action to enjoin the
public nuisance. The court also discarded the negligence branch of the plain-
tiff's case and dismissed the action.
Thirty-six years later the Newfoundland Supreme Court traversed the
same ground in Hickey v. Electric Reduction Co.40 Unfortunately, the court
37Seesupra, notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text.
38 [1934] 3 D.L.R. 22 (N.B.C.A.).
39A "several fishery" refers to the situation where one has been granted an exclusive
right to fish in a given place, either with or without the property in the soil: see Malcolmson
v. O'Dea (1862-64) 10 H.L.C. 591 at 617-618 per Willes J. The plaintiff in the Fillion case
had no several or separate right of fishery, i.e., one carved out of the public right, as one
had not been granted him and thus his only right to fish was as a member of the public.
40(1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 368 (Nfld. S.C.)
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showed no creativity and merely fashioned the traditional remedy. The
plaintiff, Hickey, was a commercial fisherman who alleged that the defendant
company had discharged poisonous material into Placentia Bay, "poisoning
the fish and rendering them of no commercial value." The court reviewed
various definitions of public nuisance and concluded that what was before
the court "was not a nuisance peculiar to the plaintiffs, nor confined to their
use of the waters of Placentia Bay. It was a nuisance committed against the
public. '41 Since the right to fish in the sea and in public navigable waters is a
public one, Hickey was thrust back onto the special damage requirement
imposed on private plaintiffs who seek redress for a public nuisance. Citing
extensively from McRae and Fillion, the court concluded that this was a public
nuisance from which the plaintiff derived no private right of action as he had
suffered no special damage. The crucial point of the case is the manner in which
the court dealt with the special damage requirement. The court reiterated the
general proposition that a private individual must prove that he has suffered
"peculiar" damage, damage which is direct and not consequential before he can
sue successfully in public nuisance:
It is not enough for the plaintiffs to show that their business is interrupted or
interfered with, by the public nuisance, to enable them to maintain a private
action against the defendants in respect thereof, for such interruption or inter-
ference is not a direct but merely a consequential damage resulting to them from
the nuisance.41 (Emphasis added)
Although the Chief Justice had no difficulty concluding from this that the right
which the plaintiff complained of was being interfered with was one common to
the whole community, the illogic of Kent's statement must have troubled Chief
Justice Furlong for he went on to deal with the requirement of direct damages.
Relying on a negligence case, SCM (U.K.) Ltd. v. W. J. Whittall & Son Ltd.,42
the learned judge held that the proposition that economic loss without direct
damage is not usually recoverable at law was as applicable in nuisance as it was
in the law of negligence. In the result, the action was dismissed.
It will be useful to analyze this decision further. There are two issues
involved here with respect to the question of damages: (1) did the plaintiff suffer
a special damage sufficient to allow the court to grant him relief, that is, damage
different in kind from that suffered by the rest of the community, and (2) even
if damage is proved (and the court must be referring to special damages) then
is that damage a direct result of defendant's conduct, i.e., damage that is not
too remote to be recoverable. As far as the question of remoteness is concerned,
there is a distinction between material loss and economic loss. With respect to
the first proposition, the law as set down by Kent J. in the McRae case and
adopted by Furlong C.J. in Hickey must now be taken to be that interference
with business is "not a direct but merely a consequential damage" (emphasis
added) resulting from the nuisance and thus does not constitute a sufficient
ground for recovery by a private individual in a public nuisance action.
Unfortunately Chief Justice Furlong did not elaborate on what he meant
by "consequential" damage in the public nuisance context. Two interpretations
are possible. First, consequential might include a remoteness factor. Con-
411d., at 370.
42 [1970] 3 All E.R. 245 (C.A.)
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sequential damages may be simply too remote to permit the plaintiff to recover.
If this is its meaning, it is merely a restatement of the general proposition that
damages not proximately caused by the tortfeasor's conduct are not recoverable.
But if the court meant this, it should not have suggested that economic losses
resulting from an interference with business are per se consequential and there-
fore not recoverable. Whether or not damages are direct or consequential can
only be determined by evaluating the facts of each case, not by looking to see
what type of damage was suffered.
Alternatively "consequential" could refer to damages that are different in
degree but not in kind. This is the more likely interpretation. If this is the proper
definition, it is merely a restatement of the special damage requirement. What-
ever the correct interpretation, however, it should not preclude the possibility
that damages resulting from an interference with business are recoverable if
they are shown to be different in kind from those suffered by the rest of the
community. The law is not so dogmatic as to prohibit an inquiry by the courts
into whether damages flowing from the interruption of one's business are
damages of a different nature than those suffered by the rest of the community
and thus recoverable at law by a private plaintiff. Indeed such a statement flies
in the face of clear authority to the contrary.43
Finally, the direct/consequential distinction is specious and only clouds
the real issue of whether the plaintiff suffered damage different in kind from the
rest of the community. The bald statement that interference with business is
never sufficient to ground a cause of action for a private individual short circuits
any inquiry by the courts into the special damage requirement and is contrary
to the law in other jurisdictions.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that where a plaintiff's steamship busi-
ness is interfered with by a defendant who had dammed up a navigable river
the plaintiff's damages are special and not common to the rest of the public.44
According to the court it is always a "question of fact whether the injury com-
plained of specially affects the plaintiff or a limited few.... ." Here the plain-
tiff's business was tied up for a considerable time resulting in daily losses, injury
to the goodwill of the business and a diminution in earnings, all of which were
deemed recoverable. The plaintiffs brought a similar action against another
defendant who had obstructed their navigation of the same river by erecting a
boom across it.45 This amounted to a public nuisance as well because it inter-
fered with the plaintiff's right to navigate a public highway. Interference with
the plaintiff's businesi was sufficient to grant him standing to sue and substantial
damages were awarded to him even though the plaintiff could not show the
actual extent of his damages.
In an earlier case,46 a fisherman living on a navigable stream was employed
by some of his neighbours to use his sail boat to bring them supplies and provi-
sions. In addition to this he used other boats to ply his fishing trade. The defen-
43 See text infra, accompanying notes 44-46 and supra, note 34.
44Rainy River Navigation Co. v. Ontario (1914), 17 D.L.R. 850 (Ont. C.A.).
45Rainy River Navigation Co. v. Watrous Island Boom Co. (1914), 26 O.W.R.
456 (C.A.).
46Drake v. Sault Ste. Marie Pulp Co. (1898), 25 O.A.R. 251 (C.A.)
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dant corporation wholly obstructed access to the stream by leaving log booms at
the mouth, covering the entire surface of the river. The plaintiff alleged that
both his fishing business and his trading business were seriously interfered with.
The defence was of course that the plaintiff had not proved particular damage
over and above that suffered by the rest of the community. The Court of Appeal
held that the plaintiff's business was interfered with by this public nuisance
which could not be justified as a reasonable use of the river and this "constitates
that damage peculiar to the plaintiff beyond that suffered by the rest of the lieges
which entitles him to maintain the action."47 Special damages were again a
question of fact.48 Relying on English and American authorities,49 the Ontario
Court concluded that damage to a trade or calling could satisfy the special
damage requirement and awarded the plaintiff damages.
It is interesting to note that the Ontario cases expressly approved of and
relied on the English case of Rose v. Miles,50 a case which Furlong C.J. disposed
of most unsatisfactorily by saying, "I hold the view that that judgment was
applicable only to the particular facts of that case." In Rose v. Miles the defend-
ant moored a barge across a public navigable creek, thus obstructing the creek
and preventing the plaintiff from navigating his barges laden with merchandise
along it. In the end he was forced to carry his merchandise over land at con-
siderable expense. Again the defence was that the plaintiff had not shown any
particular injury sustained as a result of the obstructions. The court, however,
held that the particular damage was proved because of the expenses he had
incurred in carrying out his trade: "if this be not a particular damage, I scarcely
know what is." 51 For no satisfactory reason, Furlong C.J. refused to follow
this case in Hickey on the ground that the judgment was applicable only to
the particular facts of the case.
The Hickey case leaves us with the general proposition that interference
with business from public nuisance does not constitute a direct damage and
therefore does not meet the special damage requirement needed to maintain
a private cause of action. But as we have seen this view is not shared by other
courts. Economic losses have often been recovered through a private action
in public nuisance. Given this apparent conflict, what is the present state of
the law? How direct must damages be before they can be recovered? Is eco-
nomic loss, by itself, too remote to be recovered? A flaw in the reasoning of
the Hickey case suggests that the Ontario view is not only the better one for
purposes of environmental protection, but the correct one at law.
The defence argued before the trial judge in Hickey that the damages
claimed by the plaintiffs were too remote in law. For this position they relied
on the SCM (U.K.) case, 52 a negligence case. Furlong C.J. felt the case was
important to the issue of public nuisance and extracted from it the proposition
that economic loss without direct damage is not usually recoverable at law.
47d., per Osler, J.A.
4 BBell v. Corporation of Quebec (1879), 5 A.C. 84 at 100 per Sir Montague Smith.
4 9 See supra, note 34 for examples of recent American authorities.
50 [1814-23] All E.R. 580.
51id. per Dampier, J.
52 [1970] 3 All E.R. 245.
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However, Denning L.J who wrote the SCM (U.K.) Ltd. opinion restricted his
conclusions to "actions for negligence, where the plaintiff has suffered no dam-
age to his person or property but has only sustained economic loss.... ." Lord
Denning's conclusion was based on common sense and public policy rather
than logic. The court did not want a contractor who had negligently cut a
power cable to be liable to thousands of factory owners whose profits had not
been diminished as a result. Common sense and public policy militated against
burdening one contractor with the whole loss when the sensible course would
be to shift the burden to the community affected. The court merely purported
to lay down the rule that economic loss in negligence actions usually should be
regarded as too remote to be recoverable. The defendant, therefore, was liable
to the plaintiff for the material damages and "the loss of profit truly consequent
thereon" but not for any other economic loss. It is clear from the judgment
that the holding in the case was to be confined to negligence cases.
Indeed this should be the case. In public nuisance cases, the private
plaintiff at the very least has suffered a certain interference with some right
which he enjoys with the rest of the public; however, this is not the case with
negligence actions where no invasion of a public right is involved. The policy
reason for refusing to make the defendant liable in the SCM (U.K.) Ltd. case
was that the court did not want to make the tortfeasor an insurer for economic
loss for all those who are within the ambit of his negligent conduct. But this
function is already performed in public nuisance cases by the special damage
requirement which was created by the courts to ensure that the wrongdoer not
be punished a hundred times for the same cause. The plaintiff must show that
the damage he suffered was direct and of a kind different in nature than that
suffered by the rest of the community. If the rest of the community all suffer
economic losses to their businesses, the plaintiff's damage would cease to be
special. It would then be for the Attorney-General to sue, for this is the
rationale behind the special damage requirement. There are cases in the law
of public nuisance where relief has been disallowed to a plaintiff on the ground
that the alleged damage is too remote,53 but this has not precluded recovery
for economic loss where the damage is a direct result of the tort.54 To use Lord
Denning's expression the direct/indirect or direct/consequential distinctions
are "illusory" and serve only to cloud the issues. It is submitted that the court
should try to determine whether the damage is direct, not too remote, peculiar
to the plaintiff and of a type that is different in kind from that suffered by the
rest of the community. This inquiry should be undertaken with respect to all
types of loss, material and economic. Finally, on the question of distinguishing
between remote and direct damages, Lord Denning perceptively concluded:
Seeing these exceptional cases one may well ask: 'How are we to say when
economic loss is too remote or not? Where is the line to be drawn?' Lawyers are
continually asking the question. But judges are never defeated by it. We may not
be able the draw the line with precision but we can always say on which side of it
any particular case falls .... But, by building up a body of case law, we shall
give guidance to practitioners sufficient for all the ordinary cases that arise.55
53 See Fleming, supra, note 1 at 342, n. 29.
541d., n. 30. And see supra, text accompanying notes 44-46.
55SCM (U.K.) Ltd. v. W. J. Whittall & Son Ltd., [1970] 3 All E.R. 245.
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The bulk of authority supports the proposition outlined above. It is sub-
mitted that although the Hickey case seems to suggest a contrary conclusion it
should be regarded as wrongly decided and as against the trend of current
authority. Fleming correctly states the law in the following passage.
According to one view, the plaintiff's injury must have been different not merely
in degree, but in kind, from that shared by the general public and this depends
on whether he has incurred pecuniary loss. The more liberal approach is to allow
recovery so long as the plaintiff's hardship and inconvenience was appreciably
more substantial, more direct and proximate, without necessarily differing in its
nature. Accordingly, he may complain of mere delay and inconvenience, provided
it was 'particular' to him, i.e., exceeded in degree what was suffered by others...
There is the undoubted modem tendency to reject the elusive distinction between
difference in kind and in degree and to allow recovery if the obstruction causes
more than mere infringement of a theoretical right which the plaintiff shares
with everyone else.5 6
IV An Alternative to the Private Suit
A private plaintiff who cannot fulfil the special damage requirement
imposed by the court is thus left with the remedy of informing the Attorney-
General of the alleged nuisance. The Attorney-General then in his discretion
may or may not bring a relator action. The exercise of this discretion
is not subject to judicial review. Although the courts have occasionally showed
a willingness to allow a private individual to bring an action on his own adding
the Attorney-General as a party defendant,5 7 the best opinion is that the courts
will adopt a very restrictive approach to this method of proceeding in an
attempt to preserve the discretionary power of the Attorney-General. 58 There-
fore, once the Attorney-General refuses to act, a private individual cannot com-
mence an action in his stead.
At first blush it may seem that a class action59 might be a possible solution
for a private individual wishing to bring an action to restrain a public nuisance
56 Fleming, supra, note 1 at 341.
57Turtle v. City of Toronto, (1924-25), 56 O.L.R. 252 (C.A.) at 277. "[The plaintiff's]
only remedy is to procure the Attorney-General to bring an action with the present
plaintiff as relator, or should the Attorney-General decline, then possibly by adding the
Attorney-General as a party defendant in the action as has even been done in some cases."
58Grant v. St. Lawrence Seaway, [1960] O.R. 298 (C.A.). In this case the plaintiff
requested the Attorney-General to act on the relation of the plaintiff to commence an
action but the Attorney General refused to so act. The plaintiff then began this action
relying on the Turtle case. The Court of Appeal disapproved of the statement sanctioning
this procedure in Turtle and held that the discretion of the Attorney-General was absolute
and not to be circumvented by the device of adding him as a party-defendant. Per
Aylesworth JA. at 304: 'To seek to add [the Attorney-General] as a defendant in an
action such as this which he has refused to institute is nothing more or less than an
attempt to flout the exercise of the discretion vested in him ... "
59A class or representative action is permissible when one person sues on behalf of
several other persons who have a common interest and common grievance, or a community
of interest in the subject matter of the suit. The relief sought must be beneficial in nature;
an action for damages cannot be brought through the vehicle of the class action as it is
assumed that damages are personal and not applicable to the rest of the class. See
Ontario Rules of Practice, Rule 75; Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd.,
[1910] 2 K.B. 1021 (C.A.); Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1 (H.C.); May v.
Wheaton (1917), 41 O.L.R. 369; Alden v. Gaglardi, (1971), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 380 (B.C.S.C.),
aff'd (1971), 16 D.L.R. (3d) 355 (C.A.).
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without having to submit the question to the discretion of the Attorney-General.
But Canadian courts have been quick to strike this approach down.60 Again the
courts are concerned about private plaintiffs circumventing the authority of the
Attorney-General by asserting that he-the plaintiff-represents all the mem-
bers of the public who are affected by the alleged nuisance. 61 The rationale for
disallowing class actions is that a class action requires a community of interest
in a given subject matter in the class of people whom the plaintiff purports to
represent. In a public nuisance, either each member of the class has suffered
substantially the same injury in which case the Attorney-General is the proper
person to sue, or a member has suffered special injury in which case the com-
munity of interest requirement is not met and the individual can then sue on
his own.
In my judgment, an action either for damages for a nuisance or for an injunction
to restrain a nuisance cannot be brought in a representative capacity. Though
there may be many others who may sustain or fear damage from the nuisance it is
clear that the injury or threatened injury must be peculiar to each person alone
or to his own property. A class or representative action is permissible, speaking
broadly, only in cases where all those whom the plaintiff claims to represent are
in the same interest (by which is meant not merely a like or similar interest) as
the plaintiff... This is very clearly brought out in Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight
Steamship Co. Ltd. (1910), 2 K.B. 1021 . . . As Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton
says at p. 1039: 'The essential condition of a representative action is that the
persons who are to be represented have the same interests as the plaintiff in one and
the same cause or matter. There must therefore be a common interest alike in
the sense that its subject must be the same' ... There is no such community of
interest here. In this case each person whom the plaintiff claims to represent has
a distinct or separate cause of action against the defendant for the special injury
and damage, if any, which that person may sustain by reason of the alleged
nuisance or threatened nuisance. It is only because of that special injury that the
individual can sue at all. To the extent that the injury affects each one as a member
of the public relief can be obtained only if the suit of the Attorney-General.
Therefore, except in the circumstance where an individual can prove special
damage the Attorney-General is the proper party plaintiff because whenever
any public right is infringed the Attorney-General is the proper public
representative.
This, however, is not without some advantages. Historically, the' Crown
as parens partrae acted as the legal representative of the Crown and was the
official designated to go before the courts to prevent the violation of the public's
rights. 63 And this is so with respect to a provincial Attorney-General even if
the alleged invasion of rights results from the breach of a federal statute or
60 St. Lawrence Rendering Co. Ltd. v. City of Cornwall, [1951] O.R. 669 at 673:
"the municipality cannot succeed in its counterclaim by alleging a class action in that it
acts on behalf of all the citizens of a municipality... A class action for nuisance is
not maintainable."
6 lPreston v. Hilton (1920), 55 D.L.R. 647 (Ont. S.C.) at 654.
621d., at 653-54. See also Turtle v. City of Toronto (1924), 56 O.L.R. 252 per Mulock
C.J.0. at 254 and per Orde J.A. at 277-78; McLeod v. White (1955), 37 M.P.R. 341
(S.C. N.B.-Ch. Div.) per McNair CJ. at 359.
63 People's Holding Co. v. A.-G. for Quebec, [1931] S.C.R. 452; A.-G. v. The Niagara
Falls International Bridge Co. (1873), 20 Grant's Ch. 34 (Ont. Ct. of Ch.).
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from the acts of a creature of federal statute.64 The courts will not question the
Attorney-General's decision to sue or not. He is the sole judge of that. Nor
will the courts express any opinion as to the way in which the Attorney-
General's discretion should be exercised. 65 His discretion in these matters is
completely unfettered. Once the Crown has commenced an action, generally
speaking, it is bound by the rules of practice and procedure like any other
litigant. However, as Anglin J. points out in the Toronto Junction Recreation
Club case, there are several exceptions to this rule: the Crown may not be
ordered to give discovery, it may not be made to give an undertaking with
respect to damages on an inter-locutary injunction, nor can the Crown be non-
suited and the Crown may be exempt from payment of costs. "As a plaintiff,
therefore, the Crown by no means puts itself in all respects in the plight of a
subject-litigant." 66 Moreover, a counter-claim cannot be pleaded against the
Crown as of right67 and a counter-claim cannot be set up at all in answer to an
information filed by the Crown.68 Also, the Crown is apparently not bound by
The Statute of Limitations. Furthermore, where a statute is being breached the
Attorney-General is not confined to the remedies prescribed in the statute but
can bring suit for any remedy he sees fit especially when the prescribed remedy
is insufficient. 69 The Attorney-General need not show any invasion of a proprie-
tary right, only that some public right has been infringed. Thus, where a public
right is infringed the Attorney-General in an action against the alleged offender
is not bound to pursue any particular remedy, even if the right is a statutory
one and the statute prescribes a certain remedy for its breach. This acquires
relevance in a pollution context. When the penalties contained in a statute prove
to be inadequate or inappropriate the Attorney-General can go beyond the
bounds of the statute and seek the type of relief more commensurate with the
nature of the offence.
Moreover, problems of proof for the Crown are simplified. Where there
is evidence that the defendant's conduct amounts to a public nuisance and thus
interferes with the rights of the public, the Attorney-General may then intervene
and seek an injunction even though there is no evidence of actual injury to the
public.70 And the contempt sanction standing behind this remedy is indeed a
serious one.71 Thus, all that need be proved is a public nuisance which tends
64Id.
65A.-G. for Ontario v. Toronto Junction Recreation Club (1904), 8 .L.R. 440
(Ont. H.C.-Exch. Div.) per Anglin J. at 444-45.
661d., at 442 and the cases cited therein.
67A.-G. for Ontario v. Russell (1921), 44 O.L.R. 103 (Ont. H.C.) per Orde J. at 110.
68A.-G. v. Grey Motors Ltd. (1928), 2 K.B. 78 per Rowlatt J. at 80: "I think it right
to point out that at the back of the apparently hard rule that there can be no set off in
this case against the Crown there lies in this fact that the subject can not make good a
claim against the Crown except in a particular way and my decision merely shows that
he cannot get around that by refusing to pay a debt to the Crown and then asserting his
claim by setting it off."
69Allstadt v. Gartner (1899), 31 O.R. 495 (Ch. Div.) per Boyd C. at 497.
70A.-G. v. Shrewsbury (Kingsland) Bridge Co. (1882), 21 Ch. Div. 752 at 755
per Fry, L
71See the dissent of O'Halloran J.A. in A.-G. of British Columbia v. Carven [1938]
4 D.L.R. 17 (B.C.C.A.) and the cases cited therein.
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to and has the potential to injure the public and the injunction will be granted.
Again, this is of major importance in the pollution context. Should the Attorney-
General be able to show the existence of some pollution that amounts to a
breach of a statute then an injunction will be granted without the necessity of
proving damages: ". . . this is an information by the Attorney-General against
a public body, to enforce the terms of a public act of Parliament. Now... it
is not necessary for the Attorney-General to show any injury at all. The
Legislature is of opinion that certain acts will produce injury, that is enough."'72
Although it is lamentable that a private individual in many circumstances
is unable to acquire standing to sue on his own behalf or on behalf of a class
of the affected members of the public, the Attorney-General, because of the
several procedural and substantive advantages accruing to him ex officio, might
be more effective in terms of seeking the most appropriate relief. He is not
strictly bound by many of the rules of practice, nor confined to any particular
remedies, nor bound to prove damages before he can seek an injunction, all
constraints which must be borne by private litigants. This flexibility accorded
to the Crown's law office may often times result in it being more advantageous
to have him seek relief on behalf of all Her Majesty's subjects than to have a
private litigant attempt to surmount the difficult standing to sue requirements
imposed by the courts in public nuisance actions.
V Remedies
Once a plaintiff has established the existence of a public nuisance, there
are basically three remedies available to him. Probably the most important and
most effective form of relief from the plaintiff's point of view is an injunction.
The granting of an injunction, an equitable remedy, is always a discretionary
matter. Section 19 of the Ontario Judicature Act73 prescribes that a court should
grant an injunction where it is just and convenient to do so. The weight of
authority seems to be that this provision has expanded somewhat the jurisdic-
tion of the court to grant an injunction over that exercised by the chancery
courts where the remedy originated, as long as the injunction is issued to protect
rights recognized by law or equity before the passing of the Act.74
Generally speaking the prerequisites for an injunction are the absence of
an adequate remedy at law and the presence of substantial harm where it appears
that such harm is not about to terminate.75 While an injunction is usually the
most effective form of relief available to a plaintiff, it concommitantly possesses
72A.-G. v. Cochermouth Local Branch (1874), 18 Eq. 172 per Jessel M.R. at 178.
The importance of this ability of the Crown to succeed upon proving that some illegal act
has been committed without addressing the proof of damage is underlined in this case
because the court, in an action tried at the same time as one brought by the relator (the
local board of a town eight miles downstream from the defendant-polluter), dismissed
an action for nuisance, based on the same facts, because the relator-plaintiff was unable
to bring forth sufficient scientific evidence of the nuisance. Thus the bill for nuisance
was dismissed but the injunction sought by the Attorney-General was granted.
73R.S.O. 1970, 228, s. 19(1).
74 Williston, W.B. and Rolls, R.J., The Law of Civil Procedure (Toronto: Butterworths,
1970) vol. 2 at 583.
75See Walker v. McKinnon Industries, [1949] O.R. 549, aff'd [1950] O.W.N. 309
(C.A.), affd [1951] 3 D.L.R. 577 (I.C.P.C.).
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the potential of substantial harm to the defendant. In the result, the analysis
a court usually follows is to weigh the advantage to be gained by the plaintiff
against the inconvenience to be thrust upon the defendant.76 To this end, all
the surrounding circumstances are reviewed. Nonetheless, the general rule still
seems to be that once a right recognized at law is shown to exist and interference
with that right is proved, an injunction should issue especially where damages
are not adequate compensation. 77 The effect of granting or refusing the injunc-
tion upon the community at large will also be considered. Thus, if the disparity
between the advantage to be gained by the plaintiff and the harm to be suffered
by the defendant and/or the rest of the community (through, for example, the
closing down of an industry)78 is substantial, the injunction may well be
refused.79 Because this remedy is discretionary the motives and conduct of both
the plaintiff and defendant are relevant factors to be considered. An injunction
will be most important for a plaintiff seeking to abate pollution, since it is
usually as important to him to have the pollution cease as it is to be recompensed
in damages. Moreover it is not necessary to wait for actual injury to occur to
bring an action for injunction. Proof of a threat or intention to do an act which,
if carried out, would result in a cause of action may be sufficient to move the
court to exercise its discretion in favour of the claimant.80 As has already been
noted, this is not the case in criminal law: an injunction will not issue to restrain
a contemplated crime even if the Attorney-General acts as plaintiff where no
public or private right is in danger of being violated by the anticipated miscon-
duct.8' Finally, an injunction can only be sought by a private plaintiff if he can
show special damage to himself (actual or threatened) over and above that
suffered by the rest of the community.82
Although relief by injunction has been denied where the relative economic
hardship that would be incurred by the parties mitigates aaginst it or the interest
of the public is best served by refusing to grant it, this does not mean that
relief by way of damages will be denied as well. Thus, damages and an injunc-
tion should be sought together.83 Generally speaking, damages will be granted
76 See Canada Paper v. Brown (1922), 23 S.C.R. 243 at 252.
77Walker v. McKinnon Industries, [1951] 3 D.L.R. 577 (J.C.P.C.) at 581 per
Lord Simonds.
7 8 See for example, Black v. Canadian Copper Co. (1917), 12 O.W.N. 243 (H.C.)
where farmers complained that smoke from nearby refineries in Sudbury was damaging
their crops. On the effect of granting an injunction Middleton J. made the following
comment at 244: "Mines cannot be operated without the production of smoke from the
... smelters... there are circumstances in which it is impossible for the individual to
assert his individual rights as to inflict a substantial injury upon the whole community.
If the mines should be prevented from operating, the community should not exist at all...
The consideration of this situation induced the plaintiff's counsel to abandon the claims
for injunctions. The Court ought not to destroy the mining industry-nickel is of great
value to the world--even if a few farms are damaged or destroyed; but in all such cases,
compensation, liberally estimated, ought to be awarded."
79Canada Paper Co. v. Brown (1922), 23 S.C.R. 243 at 252 per Duff J.; Godfrey v.
Good Rich Refining Co. Ltd., [ 1940] O.R. 190 (Ont. C.A.).
8OWatson v. Jackson (1914), 31 O.L.R. 481 (C.A.) per Riddell J. at 503.
81A.-G. for Ontario v. Canadian Wholesale Grocers Association (1922), 52 O.L.R.
536 (H.C.). See note 17, supra, and accompanying text.
82 Prosser, supra, note 3 at 625.
83 Turtle v. City of Toronto (1924-25), 56 O.L.R. 252 (C.A.) at 276 per Masten J.A.
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instead of an injunction where the latter would be overly oppressive to the
defendant or where the plaintiff's injury is adequately compensable in money
damages. In the context of pollution, however, damages will not usually go to
the root of the problem because they do not go to remove the nuisance. They
provide however both an alternative and a corollary to an injunction. The
private plaintiff must prove his damages before they are recoverable.84 As has
been noted this is not necessarily required of the Attorney-General suing on
behalf of the entire community. 85 The damages alleged, however, must be both
a direct result of defendant's conduct and reasonably foreseeable.8 6
With respect to damages to property, damages will not be granted for
depreciation in the potential selling price of the land, only for loss actually
suffered.87 Moreover, damages will only be given for losses suffered up to the
date of judgment. Thus, a successful argument by the plaintiff that offers for
his property indicate that it has declined in value is precluded if no actual sale
is made.88 And it is important to note that a property owner can recover damages
for loss in rent caused by a nuisance.89
There is no clear rule concerning when damages will be granted in lieu
of an injunction. It is impossible to be dogmatic in this area as so much depends
on the facts of the case and the discretion of the court. The best attempt at
prescribing some sort of rule of thumb was made by A. L. Smith, L.J. in
Sheller v. City of London Electric Lighting Co.,90 wherein he stated:
In my opinion, it may be stated as a good working rule that-
(1) if the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small
(2) and one which is capable of being estimated in money
(3) and is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment
(4) and the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant
an injunction:
then damages in substitution for an injunction may be given.
There may also be cases in which, though the four abovementioned requirements
exist, the defendant by his conduct... has disentitled himself from asking that
damages may be assessed in substitution for an injunction.
It is impossible to lay down any rule as to what under the differing circumstances
of each case constitutes either a small injury or one that can be estimated in money
... , or an adequate compensation, or what would be oppressive to the defendant.
This must be left to the good sense of the tribunal which deals with each case
as it comes up for adjudication.
84Butt v. City of Oshawa (1926), 59 O.L.R. 520 (C.A.); Godfrey v. Good Rich
Refining Co. Ltd., [1940] O.R. 190 (Ont. C.A.).
85Supra, text accompanying notes 65-67.
86The Wagon Mound (No. 2) [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (J.C.P.C.) per Lord Reid at 639-40.
87 Grosvener Hotel v. Hamilton, [1894] 2 Q.B. 836 (C.A.) per Lindley L.J. at 840;
Cox v. Mayor of Essonden (1894), 16 A.L.J. 7 (S.C. Vict.) where an injunction was granted
to restrain defendants from sending anymore sewage onto plaintiff's land and damage
were awarded by measuring the cost of putting the land in as good a condition as it was
before the defendants injured it, plus a sum that would compensate the plaintiff for other
grievances of which he complained including the loss of profits which would have been
made had he been able to use his land for coursing.
88 Butt v. City of Oshawa (1926), 59 O.L.R. 252 (C.A.).
89Drysdale v. Dugus (1896), 26 S.C.R. 20.
90 [1895] 1 Ch. 287 at 322-23 (C.A.).
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Public Nuisance
Finally, a plaintiff may feel that resort to the law courts will not provide
him with a sufficiently speedy and effective remedy with respect to the wrong
allegedly being done to him. In such a situation he may rely upon self help or
as it is commonly called, abatement. Resort to this remedy should only be had
in emergency situations. This is because the courts have always looked upon
this remedy with much disfavour and thus have very strictly controlled it and
attended it in certain situations with some very serious consequences. The
classic statement on this remedy is that of Lord Atkinson in Logan Navigation
Co. v. Lamarg Bleaching, Dyeing & Finishing Co.,91 where he made the follow-
ing comments:
It has been well said that the abatement of nuisance is a remedy which the law
does not favour and is not usually advisable and that its exercise destroys any
right of action in respect of the nuisance.
In Earl of Lonsdale v. Nelson, Best J. said: 'The security of lives and property
may sometimes require so speedy a remedy as not to allow time to call on the
person on whose property the mischief has arisen to remedy it. In such cases
an individual would be justified in abating a nuisance from omission without
notice. In all other cases of such nuisances, persons should not take the law into
their own hands, but follow the advice of Lord Hale and appeal to a court of
justice.' In the abatement of nuisance unnecessary damages must not be done...
Lord Campbell in Dimes v. Pettey said: 'if there be a nuisance in a public highway,
a private individual cannot of his own authority abate it unless it does him a
special injury and he can interfere with it as far as is necessary to exercise his
right of passing along the highway; . . . we clearly think that he cannot justify
doing any damage to the property of the person who has improperly placed the
nuisance in the highway if, in avoiding it he might have passed on with reasonable
convenience.' Again where there are two ways of abating a nuisance, the less
mischievous is to be followed, unless it would inflict some wrong on an innocent
third party or the public and previous notice is given when necessary.
Thus where a person enters upon the property of a tortfeasor to abate a
nuisance, he must act reasonably in all respects to ensure that no damage is
done. More importantly, once the nuisance is abated, the abater loses his cause
of action and is thus precluded from seeking any relief in damages. This, then,
is the most compelling deterrent to the use of this remedy. Abatement is looked
upon by the courts as a privilege, one which is not to be abused and which will
be strictly controlled. Thus, because the rationale for abatement has always
been the necessity of a speedy remedy in place of the rather cumbersome and
slow judicial process, the remedy must be exercised within a reasonable time
after first learning of the alleged nuisance. Abatement can be both with respect
to actual harm and threatened harm. 92 Questions of reasonableness and whether
there should or should not be notice seem to turn on the particular facts of
each case. Lastly, with respect to a public nuisance, a private individual cannot
justify abatement unless it causes or threatens special damage to him above
and beyond that suggested by the rest of the community and then he may only
abate the nuisance to the extent required to protect his own interests.
91 [1927] A.C. 226 at 244-45.
92See Lemmon v. Webb [1894] 3 Ch. 1, [1895] A.C. 1 where it was held that the
defendant was justified in cutting down some branches from plaintiff's trees overhanging
defendant's property even though the harm was merely threatened and not actual.
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VI Conclusion
The private individual's ability to sue with respect to a public nuisance
is circumscribed with a variety of limitations. However, if he has suffered
damage to his person or property he still has recourse to action for trespass,
negligence and private nuisance. Nonetheless, there will still be situations
where these torts will not be applicable. A plaintiff then of necessity must
resort to bringing an action in public nuisance. In spite of the obvious plight
of the plaintiff, a review of recent Canadian case law suggests that one should
not be optimistic about any liberalization of approach by our courts with respect
to the grounding of a private action for public nuisance. Our judges apparently
feel themselves strictly bound by principles and doctrines established centuries
ago. This is especially relevant for those concerned with the quality of our
environment and the role our legal system can play with respect to this problem.
Our courts have displayed a marked level of insensitivity toward our changing
social attitudes that now demand that pollution problems be dealt with in a
meaningful way. The remedies available through the legal system have not
kept pace with society's current attitude towards the severity of the "wrong!'.
Several states in the United States, apparently frustrated by the common law's
inability to respond to the problem, have resorted to legislative solutions. 93
Perhaps we will soon be following the American lead.
93 Several statutes have been passed to provide for public actions to restrain a public
nuisance. See, for example, Florida Statutes Annotated, s. 60.05 (1969); Wisconsin Statutes
Annotated, s. 280.02 (1958) where a private individual with leave of the court in a relator
action can sue to abate a nuisance and the private individual need not show special
damages: Michigan Compiled Laws (Ann.), s. 14.528.
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